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GRIFFIN, J.
In this defamation case, Christopher Comins [“Comins”], appeals a trial court 
order entering partial final judgment in favor of Appellee/Cross-Appellant, Matthew 
VanVoorhis [“VanVoorhis”], for Comins’s failure to comply with the presuit notice 
requirement of section 770.01, Florida Statutes (2008).  Comins argues that the trial 
court erred because VanVoorhis is not a “media defendant” and thus is not entitled to 
presuit notice.  Alternatively, Comins contends that, even if VanVoorhis had been 
entitled to presuit notice, VanVoorhis waived that right by his efforts to remain 
anonymous.1  We affirm. 
This case arises out of a May 19, 2008 incident that involved Comins.  According 
to various reports prepared by the Orange County Sheriff’s Office, at around 4:30 p.m., 
people began to notify authorities that two wolves or dogs were in a pasture with cattle 
located near the intersection of State Road 417 and Narcoosee Road.  Over the next 
two hours, the Orange County Sheriff’s Office Communications Center received multiple 
calls.  Some witnesses believed, at first, that the dogs were wolves; other witnesses 
stated that they knew the dogs were domestic animals because the dogs had collars.  
Witnesses reported observing the dogs circling and cornering the cattle, including a 
young calf.  Some witnesses believed the dogs were just playing; others thought the 
dogs were acting in an aggressive manner.  Eventually, reports came in that a man had 
shot the dogs.  Twenty people were listed as witnesses to the shooting.  
Comins, who is friends with the landowner, was driving past the pasture as these 
events were unfolding, and called to alert the landowner of the situation.  According to 
Comins and the landowner, the landowner told Comins that animals attacking the cattle 
should be shot.  Comins said he went into the pasture, was confronted by the dogs, felt 
1 In his cross-appeal, VanVoorhis appeals a trial court order denying his motion 
for sanctions under the trial court’s inherent authority and under section 57.105, Florida 
Statutes (2011) [the “57.105 motion”].  VanVoorhis argues that the trial court erred by 
denying the 57.105 motion because Comins’s counsel misrepresented to the court that 
presuit notice under section 770.01 had been given.  We affirm the cross-appeal without 
further comment.
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threatened, and shot at the dogs six times.  The following narrative was prepared by the 
Orange County Sheriff’s Office in their investigative findings: 
After the sixth shot at the dogs, an unknown man (later 
identified as Christopher Butler [the dogs’ owner]) to Comins 
ran into the pasture to protect and/or take control of the 
dogs.  Statements indicate that Butler was yelling that the 
dogs were his though Comins said he was not aware that he 
was the actual owner nor did Comins hear Butler.
Comins looked at this person (Butler) while Butler was 
moving to cover one of the dogs.  Comins then turned 
around and fired the seventh and final shot at the second 
dog.  
Comins had turned his back on the second dog, placed his 
gun into his right back pocket and walked eleven steps away 
from this dog.  He then turns around, pulls his gun and fires 
the seventh shot when the dog attempts to stand up as 
indicated in the original video.  
Where Butler is physically in control of the first dog and the 
second dog is having difficulty standing or moving far, the 
need to continue shooting the second dog to protect the 
cattle is no longer required. 
Turning around to shoot the second dog behind Comins’ 
back while Butler was present was unnecessary per Florida 
State Statute 828.12 [Cruelty to Animals].
Local news outlets, such as the Orlando Sentinel, WKMG Local 6, WESH 
Channel 2, and WFTV Channel 9, reported on the incident.  Then, in early June 2008, a 
witness to the incident, who had caught the shooting on camera, posted the video of the 
shooting onto YouTube.  Throughout the summer, the incident continued to be reported 
in the news.  Thousands of people signed an online petition, entitled “Justice for Husky 
Dogs Shot in Orange County, Florida,” demanding that Comins be charged with animal 
cruelty.  Eventually, in late July, Comins was charged with one count of misdemeanor 
animal cruelty.
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VanVoorhis learned about the incident from a Facebook group that had been 
created to express outrage over the incident.  At this time, VanVoorhis had a bachelor’s 
degree in sociology from Indiana University, a master’s degree in sociology from the 
University of Florida, and was working towards his doctoral degree in sociology at the 
University of Florida.  Since 2007, VanVoorhis had maintained a blog, entitled “Public 
Intellectual,” using the online blog platform, WordPress.2  He ran the blog under a 
pseudonym, M. Frederick Voorhees (his full legal name being Matthew Frederick 
VanVoorhis).  VanVoorhis testified in his deposition that he founded the blog in order to 
“publicly comment on issues of public concern in an intellectual manner without tying my 
comments to my professional identity.”3  VanVoorhis testified that he went by a 
pseudonym to protect his identity because, while a student, he wrote critiques of 
academia as an institution and its ability to connect with the public.  Relying on the 
video itself and the online news articles reporting the incident, VanVoorhis published the 
blog posts at issue in this case.
Sometime in early 2009, Comins became aware of VanVoorhis’s blog posts.  
Comins traced the blog posts to the University of Florida’s computer network and, 
subsequently, through counsel, sent a letter [the "Killgore letter"] to “M. Frederick 
Voorhees” c/o the University of Florida on March 23, 2009.  In this letter, Comins’s 
attorney, Frank H. Killgore, Jr. [“Attorney Killgore”], expressed concern over several 
2 WordPress is a free blog and web hosting service.  en.wordpress.com/tos/.  
VanVoorhis’s blog can be located at www.publicintellectual.wordpress.com.  
3 VanVoorhis also testified in his deposition that “Public Intellectual” had won 
“The Thinking Blogger Award” (a weekly blogger award given to a thoughtful blog post) 
for an article, entitled The McDonaldization of Citizenship.  VanVoorhis testified that the 
article applied a theory from George Ritzer’s book “The McDonaldization of Society” to 
the idea of citizenship, and what it means to be an active citizen in the United States. 
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death threats that individuals had made in the blog’s comments section and over the 
fact that Comins’s personal and business contact information had been posted in the 
comments section.  Attorney Killgore requested that VanVoorhis delete the blog in its 
entirety or, at least, remove the death threats and all references to Comins’s contact 
information.4  Comins then reported the blog post to the University of Florida Police 
Department, which contacted VanVoorhis about Comins’s complaint.  
Eventually, Comins obtained VanVoorhis’s full legal name and address.  On May 
13, 2009, Comins filed a four-count complaint against VanVoorhis for libel (Count I), 
libel per se (Count II), defamation by implication (Count III), and tortious interference 
with a business relationship (Count IV).  Thereafter, VanVoorhis filed a counterclaim 
against Comins for abuse of process and filed an answer and asserted eleven 
affirmative defenses to Comins’s complaint.  At issue here is VanVoorhis’s fifth 
affirmative defense that Comins failed to comply with the presuit notice requirement of 
section 770.01 before filing the complaint against him.  Section 770.01 provides: 
Before any civil action is brought for publication or 
broadcast, in a newspaper, periodical, or other medium, of a 
libel or slander, the plaintiff shall, at least 5 days before 
instituting such action, serve notice in writing on the 
defendant, specifying the article or broadcast and the 
statements therein which he or she alleges to be false and 
defamatory.  
§ 770.01, Fla. Stat. (2008).  VanVoorhis also filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit on this 
same basis.  On September 10, 2010, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to 
dismiss.  Comins’s counsel, Christopher M. Harne [“Attorney Harne”], told the trial court 
that presuit notice had been sent.  Based on this representation, the trial court granted 
4 Comins contends that the Killgore letter was sufficient to meet the requirements 
of section 770.01, Florida Statutes; however, this letter fails in its essential function to 
notify the defendant that the article was false and defamatory.
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VanVoorhis’s motion to dismiss, but gave Comins leave to amend his complaint to 
properly plead compliance with the presuit notice requirement.  
Comins’s first amended complaint alleged that “Plaintiff complied with Fla. Stat. § 
770.01 in an abundance of caution by serving notice in writing on Defendant care of the 
University of Florida on March 23, 2009, identifying the articles which Plaintiff alleges to 
be false and defamatory.”  Later, Comins filed a second amended complaint, which 
amended the presuit notice allegation to read:
Defendant is not a media defendant, and therefore Plaintiff 
was not required to provide him with pre-suit notice before 
instituting this action.  However, even if this Court finds 
Defendant was entitled to pre-suit notice, which Plaintiff 
denies, Plaintiff has either satisfied all conditions precedent 
to bringing this lawsuit or such conditions have been waived 
or excused by Defendant’s conduct.
On March 1, 2011, VanVoorhis filed a motion for summary judgment on the 
presuit notice issue.  The trial court held a hearing on VanVoorhis’s motion for summary 
judgment and ruled in favor of VanVoorhis based on Comins’s failure to comply with the 
presuit notice requirement of section 770.01.  The trial court said that “[t]he issue, then, 
is whether or a [sic] not Defendant’s blog falls under the rubric of ‘other medium’ as 
used in section 770.01.”  Finding that “other medium” does include the internet, the trial 
court held that Comins was required to give VanVoorhis presuit notice under section 
770.01.  The trial court also rejected Comins’s waiver argument as having no factual or 
legal basis.  We agree.5
5 The record shows that it was not very difficult to find and to communicate with 
VanVoorhis.  Failing any other alternative, Comins could have posted a retraction notice 
in the comments section of VanVoorhis’s blog.  We approve the trial court’s conclusion 
as to waiver without further comment.
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On appeal, Comins argues that the trial court erred by ruling that Comins’s failure 
to comply with the presuit notice requirement of section 770.01 barred his claims 
because the section only applies to a “media defendant” and VanVoorhis is not a 
“media defendant.”  
Although the express language of section 770.01 does not limit the type of 
defendant entitled to presuit notice, “[e]very Florida court that has considered the 
question has concluded that the presuit notice requirement applies only to ‘media 
defendants,’ not to private individuals.”  Zelinka v. Americare Healthscan, Inc., 763 So. 
2d 1173, 1175 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).  
The "media defendant" issue arises because of certain language appearing in 
prior decisions of the Florida Supreme Court.  In Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 
2d 1098, 1112 (Fla. 2008), the court commented that “[u]nder Florida’s defamation law, 
a prospective plaintiff is required to give a media defendant notice five days before 
initiating a civil action.”  However, this language does not necessarily mean that only 
media defendants are entitled to presuit notice under section 770.01.6  The line of cases 
imposing the “media defendant” requirement rely mainly on the Florida Supreme Court’s 
much earlier opinion in Ross v. Gore, 48 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1950).  
Section 770.01 was originally enacted in 1933 and, until 1976, applied only to 
actions brought for publication of a libel in a newspaper or periodical:   
6 Indeed, the Florida Supreme Court has held that section 770.07, which 
establishes the point in time when a cause of action for defamation accrues, applies to 
both media and private individual defendants.  Wagner, Nugent v. Flanagan, 629 So. 2d 
113, 115 (Fla. 1993).  The Wagner court acknowledged that chapter 770 primarily 
addresses media defendants, but the court pointed out that the chapter is broadly titled 
“Civil Actions for Libel” and that limiting section 770.07 to media defendants only “would 
allow potentially endless liability since Florida Statutes contains no statute of repose for 
this particular tort.”  Id.  
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Before any civil action is brought for publication, in a 
newspaper or periodical, of a libel, the plaintiff shall, at least 
five days before instituting such action, serve notice in 
writing on defendant, specifying the article, and the 
statements therein, which he alleges to be false and 
defamatory.
§ 770.01, Fla. Stat. (1950) (emphasis added).  In Ross v. Gore, the Florida Supreme 
Court explained that one of the objectives of the Legislature when originally enacting the 
statute was to “afford to newspapers and periodicals an opportunity in every case to 
make a full and fair retraction in mitigation of the damages which a person may have 
suffered by reason of the publication.”  48 So. 2d at 415.  The issue in Ross was the 
constitutionality of section 770.01.  One of the arguments advanced by the appellant 
was that the statute violated the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution 
because it “grants a special privilege to newspapers and periodicals . . . . "  Id. at 414.  
In response to this argument, the Ross court discussed the purpose of granting 
newspapers and periodicals such “special privilege”: 
The provision for retraction is peculiarly appropriate to 
newspapers and periodicals, as distinguished from private 
persons.  There is a valid difference in the classes, in this 
respect, which is sufficient to sustain the validity of the 
provision under the ‘equal protection’ clause.
Id.  
Another argument advanced by the Ross appellants was that, in the absence of 
notice and a retraction, their suit for defamation should not have been dismissed but, 
rather, should have been limited to actual damages.  According to the appellants, to 
construe the section as a condition precedent would be unconstitutional.  Id. at 415.  In 
response to this argument, the court held that the clear language of the statute 
established that notice was a condition precedent to suit.  Id.  The court reasoned that 
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construing the statute otherwise would “defeat what must have been one of the 
objectives of the Legislature in enacting the statute.”  Id.  The court explained that the 
purpose of section 770.01 was “also to afford to newspapers and periodicals an 
opportunity in every case to make a full and fair retraction in mitigation of the damages 
which a person may have suffered by reason of the publication.  This objective is a 
salutary one, and we do not think it constitutes unjust discrimination in favor of 
newspapers and periodicals.”  Id.  
The discussion in Ross focused on the rationale for granting newspapers and 
periodicals the right to retraction.  First, the court emphasized that “[t]he public has an 
interest in the free dissemination of news.”  Id.  The court stated: 
In the free dissemination of news, then, and fair comment 
thereon, hundreds and thousands of news items and articles 
are published daily and weekly in our newspapers and 
periodicals.  This court judicially knows that it frequently 
takes a legal tribunal months of diligent searching to 
determine the facts of a controversial situation.  When it is 
recalled that a reporter is expected to determine such facts 
in a matter of hours or minutes, it is only reasonable to 
expect that occasional errors will be made.  Yet, since the 
preservation of our American democracy depends upon the 
public’s receiving information speedily—particularly upon 
getting news of pending matters while there still is time for 
public opinion to form and be felt—it is vital that no 
unreasonable restraints be placed upon the working news 
reporter or the editorial writer.
Id.  In other words, the Ross court determined that it is necessary in a democracy for 
the people to have speedy access to fact reporting and editorial comment.  The Ross 
court was especially concerned that removing the safeguards of section 770.01 would 
result in a press that is “so inhibited that its great and necessary function of policing our 
society through reporting its events and by analytical criticism would be seriously 
impaired.”  Id. at 415.7 
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In 1976, section 770.01 was amended to apply to actions brought for publication 
or broadcast of a libel or slander in a newspaper, periodical, or other medium.  Perhaps 
the Legislature enacted this amendment to expand the protection of the section to 
include only radio and television broadcasts.  Indeed, at that time, other sections of 
chapter 770 were amended to include explicit references to radio and television 
broadcasts.  However, the amended language of section 770.01 was not so specific.   
In Laney v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 910 (S.D. Fla. 1982), 
Judge King had to decide whether section 770.01 applied to protect the author of an 
allegedly defamatory letter to the editor that was published by Knight-Ridder 
Newspapers.  The plaintiff in the case had not complied with the section’s presuit notice 
requirement as to the letter’s author, but argued that the requirement did not apply to 
nonmedia defendants.  Id. at 912.  
Judge King observed that: 
[T]he provision fails to specify that notice need be provided 
only to media-defendants.  If the legislature did intend to so 
limit the applicability of this provision, it seems logical that a 
specific restriction would have been inserted into the statute.  
One may reasonably infer from the generality of the 
language, therefore, that the statute requires notice to all 
potential defendants in an action for libel or slander.”
Id.  Moreover, Judge King found that “it would be grossly unfair to construe the statute 
in such a way as to deny non-media defendants the opportunity to mitigate actual 
damages or avoid the assessment of punitive damages.”  Id. at 913.  This is so because 
“[n]otice affords defendants the opportunity to issue a retraction or even to settle the 
overall conflict, thereby mitigating damages or eliminating litigation altogether.  At the 
7 The Ross court observed that it was the Legislature’s prerogative whether to 
include radio broadcasting stations within the terms of the statute.  Id. at 414.
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very least, notice may afford a non-media defendant the chance to consult with an 
attorney about legal matters with which (s)he may be extremely unfamiliar.”  Id.
In this ruling, Judge King acknowledged that the Florida Supreme Court’s 
decision in Ross “provides perhaps the strongest support for plaintiff’s position.”  
However, Judge King stated that, “[w]hile the [Ross court] indirectly referred to the 
statute’s applicability in terms of newspapers and periodicals, it did not specifically 
describe the parameters of the statute’s applicability, nor, for that matter, provide 
sufficient justification for its decisions to discuss applicability solely in terms of 
newspapers and periodicals.”  Id. at 912.  Rather, “[t]he [Ross court] may very well have 
discussed the applicability of the statute in these terms simply because the defendants 
in the case were media-defendants.”  Id. at 912 n.6.  
Judge King’s reasoning has since been rejected by other courts addressing this 
issue.  In Bridges v. Williamson, 449 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), the Second 
District noted that the Ross court construed 770.01 “to apply exclusively to suits against 
newspapers and periodicals, as distinguished from private individuals.”  Id. at 401.  
When section 770.01 was later amended, “the legislature was aware of Ross since it is 
presumed to be cognizant of the judicial construction of a statute when contemplating 
changes in the statute.”  Id. (citing Seddon v. Harpster, 403 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 1981)).  
Thus, “[h]ad the legislature intended to extend the application of the statute to nonmedia 
defendants, it could have inserted such a provision into the statute at that time.”  Id. 
Rather, “[t]he language of the statute is limited to newspapers, periodicals, and other 
media.  Nowhere does the statute contain the words ‘nonmedia’ or ‘private individuals.’”  
Id.  
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A week after the Bridges opinion was published, the Third District published its 
opinion in Davies v. Bossert, 449 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), in which it also held 
that section 770.01 applies only to media defendants.  In Davies, the court was 
confronted with whether the plaintiff was required to follow the 770.01 presuit notice 
requirement before filing suit for slander over “allegedly defamatory statements made by 
a private citizen [about a lobster fisherman he believed was stealing lobster from the 
nets of other fishermen] over an emergency channel of a citizen’s band radio.”  Id. at 
419.  The Davies court held that this non-media defendant was not entitled to presuit 
notice under section 770.01.  Id. at 421.  Disapproving of Judge King’s ruling in Laney, 
the Davies court stated: 
Although the issue before the Florida Supreme Court in 
Ross was different, the court unavoidably recognized that 
the statute had no application to non-media defendants.  The 
main issue in Ross was whether the statute was 
discriminatory in that it permitted media defendants to avoid 
punitive damages by publishing a retraction or apology for 
libelous statements while not affording the same privilege to 
non-media defendants.  The court did not hold, as does 
Laney, that section 770.01 applies to media and non-media 
libelees alike, but recognized that the unambiguous 
language of the statutory condition precedent applies only to 
media defendants.  Ross, 48 So. 2d at 414-15.  
Id. at 420.  Then, the Davies court examined the 1976 revision of the statute: 
The earlier version of section 770.01, which was construed 
in Ross v. Gore, referred only to publication of a libel in a 
newspaper or periodical.  In 1976, the statute was amended 
to include reference to (1) “broadcast” (in addition to 
“publication”), (2) “other medium” (in addition to “newspaper 
and periodical”), and (3) “slander” (in addition to “libel”).  Ch. 
76-123, § 1, Laws of Fla.  The following additions were also 
made to Section 770.02: “or broadcast station” in the 
section’s heading; “or broadcast” (as an addition to “article”); 
and a reference to correction, apology, or retraction in the 
case of a broadcast.  Section 770.03 was also amended so 
as to refer to broadcasting stations in general and not just to 
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radio broadcasting stations.  Section 770.04 refers 
specifically to the civil liability of an “owner, licensee, or 
operator of a radio or television broadcasting station, and the 
agents, or employees of any such owner, licensee or 
operator.”
Since no other section of Chapter 770 uses the language 
“other medium” as found in section 770.01, we can infer 
reasonably that the legislature intended that term to include 
television and radio broadcasting stations.  There is no 
logical reason to suppose that section 770.01 contemplates 
any form of medium not covered by other sections of the 
chapter.  In the absence of legislative history, we can look to 
earlier enactments and other sections of the present Chapter 
770 to determine the intent and meaning of the words “or 
other medium” in section 770.01.  See Florida State Racing 
Commission v. McLaughlin, 102 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1958) (if 
part of a statute appears to have a clear meaning if 
considered alone but when given that meaning is 
inconsistent with other parts of the same statute or others in 
pari material, the court will examine the entire act and those 
in pari material in order to ascertain the overall legislative 
intent); Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or. 99, 593 P.2d 777, 791 
(1979) (in determining whether Oregon’s retraction statute’s 
reference to “publisher” was limited to a media entity, court 
looked to other provisions of the statute).  
Id.; see also Gifford v. Bruckner, 565 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (citing to Davies 
for the proposition that “other medium” includes only television and radio broadcasters).    
The Davies court’s rationale was implicitly rejected in Nelson v. Associated 
Press, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 1468 (S.D. Fla. 1987).  In Nelson, the plaintiff relied on Davies 
and Bridges to argue that section 770.01 did not apply to dispatches transmitted by the 
Associated Press over their wire service.  Id. at 1473-74.  Rejecting the plaintiff’s 
argument, Judge Spellman ruled that the language “other medium” should be read 
broadly to include wire services like the AP.  
In Mancini v. Personalized Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc., 702 So. 2d 1376 
(Fla. 4th DCA 1997), the plaintiff had successfully argued to the trial court that section 
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770.01 did not apply to the defendant in the case.  On appeal, the court rejected the 
plaintiff’s argument: 
To the extent [plaintiff’s] argument is based on the fact that 
defendant is a full-time assistant state attorney as well as a 
part-time columnist, we discern no logical distinction 
between defendant and any other columnist.  To the extent 
that plaintiff asserts that the statute is applicable only to 
actions against the newspaper itself, as opposed to the 
individuals writing for the newspaper, this restrictive 
interpretation of section 770.01 is not supported by the 
language of the statute.  
Id. at 1378.  
The Mancini opinion mainly concerns the plaintiff’s argument that section 770.01 
applies only to actions against the newspaper itself.  Rejecting this argument, the 
Mancini court held that interpreting Ross to exclude reporters, editorial writers, and 
columnists from the protection of 770.01 would be “contrary not only to the plain 
language of the statute, but to the legislative intent of the statute as expressed in Ross.”  
Id.  The court further stated, “There is nothing in Ross to indicate that in using the term 
‘newspaper’ our supreme court was referring only to the entity as distinguished from the 
individual columnists, reporters and editorial writers who write for the newspaper.”  Id.  
Rather, the Mancini court observed that Ross emphasized that it is vital that no 
unreasonable restraints be placed upon the working news reporter or the editorial writer. 
Id. at 1379 (citing Ross, 48 So. 2d at 415).  Moreover, the Mancini court noted that 
“there is nothing in the language of the companion retraction provision, section 770.02, 
that would limit the protection to the newspaper publisher . . . .”  Id. at 1379.
The Mancini court stressed that its interpretation of the scope of section 770.01 
“does not conflict with the series of cases holding the statute does not apply to ‘non-
media defendants’ . . . [r]ather, the question is what is meant by ‘non-media defendant,’ 
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a term not appearing within the statute, but only in case law.”  Id. at 1380.  The court 
explained: 
The use of the phrase “non-media defendant” in these cases 
was not meant to distinguish between individuals and 
corporations, but rather to separate third parties who are not 
engaged in the dissemination of news and information 
through the news and broadcast media from those who are 
so engaged.  In Davies the defendant, found to be a “non-
media defendant,” was a private citizen who made the 
alleged defamatory statements over an emergency channel 
of a citizen’s band radio.  In Bridges the court declined to 
extend the reach of the statute to protect a private individual 
whose allegedly libelous statement had been republished by 
the newspaper.  In Gifford the “non-media defendant” was 
an aerial advertising firm being sued for a banner towed 
overhead by airplane.  Most recently, in [Tobkin] . . . we held 
that the protection of section 770.01 did not cover individuals 
who sent letters to The Florida Bar.  
According to the Mancini court, the scope of section 770.01’s protection is defined by 
separating third parties who are not engaged in the dissemination of news and 
information “through the news and broadcast media” from those who are so engaged.  
In Ortega Trujillo v. Banco Central Del Ecuador, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1334 (S.D. Fla. 
1998), Judge King sought to do just that.  In Ortega Trujillo, the defendant—a public-
relations firm in the business of public relations and lobbying for its clients—sought 
protection under section 770.01 for a press release it published that contained allegedly 
defamatory statements.  Rejecting the defendant’s contention that it qualified as a 
media defendant, Judge King explained that “[b]y definition, all news media 
disseminates information, but it is a syllogism to conclude . . . that all those who 
disseminate information automatically qualify as news media.”  Id. at 1338.  
Attempting to define the scope of “news media,” Judge King stated: 
The function of the media is to inform and to initiate 
“‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate on public 
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issues.” See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339, 
94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974) (citing New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 
L.Ed.2d 686 (1964)). 
Id.  Judge King found that the defendant was in the business of public relations and 
lobbying, and so could not fall within the definition of media, no matter how “nebulous” 
that definition is.  Id.  In particular, the defendant “does not impartially disseminate 
information. Nor, for that matter, does it issue unsolicited, disinterested and neutral 
commentary as to matters of public interest, or editorialize as to matters of public 
interest without being commissioned to do so by its clients.”  Id.  
Eventually, our courts were confronted with cases involving defamatory 
statements made over the internet.  In Zelinka, 763 So. 2d at 1173, the court had to 
decide whether a plaintiff in a libel action arising out of a posting on an internet 
“message board” was required to comply with the presuit notice requirements of section 
770.01.  Ultimately, the court held that the defendant was “a mere internet-using, private 
individual,” and not a media defendant to which the presuit notice requirements apply. 
Id.  
The facts of Zelinka were as follows: 
Respondents, Americare Healthscan, Inc., Americare 
Diagnostics, Inc., and Dr. Joseph P. D'Angelo, filed a four-
count complaint against petitioner, Robert Zelinka, and other 
defendants, alleging in counts I and II libel per se and libel 
per quod based on the publication of allegedly false and 
defamatory statements on an internet “message board.” The 
complaint alleges that the board where the messages were 
posted is maintained for the purpose of transmitting 
information about Technical Chemicals and Products, Inc., a 
corporation which was involved in litigation with the 
respondents. Zelinka was not alleged to be the owner or 
operator of the web site where the bulletin board was 
located.
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Id. at 1174.  The petitioner/defendant argued that the internet is an “other medium” 
within the meaning of the statute, but the Zelinka court declined to reach that issue.  
Rather, the court held that “[e]ven if an internet bulletin board was a ‘medium’ within the 
scope of the statute, no precedent would allow this court to extend the statutory notice 
requirement to a private individual who merely posts a message on the board.”  Id. at 
1175.  The court characterized the petitioner/defendant in that case as being in “the 
same position as that of the private individuals in the Davies, Bridges and Gifford cases, 
whose statements were ‘broadcast’ to the public, but who themselves were not 
members of ‘the media.’”  Id.  However, the Zelinka court did acknowledge, in dictum, 
that “[i]t may well be that someone who maintains a web site and regularly publishes 
internet ‘magazines’ on that site might be considered a ‘media defendant’ who would be 
entitled to notice.”  Id.
Such a defendant was found to be entitled to presuit notice in Alvi Armani 
Medical, Inc. v. Hennessey, 629 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (S.D. Fla. 2008).  In Alvi, the 
defendant was the owner, host, and publisher of a website called the “Hair Restoration 
Network,” which was identified as being “dedicated to providing information to the 
consumer public about the hair restoration and transplant industry.”  Id. at 1303-04.  The 
defendant claimed that the defamation suit should be dismissed because the plaintiffs 
had failed to comply with section 770.01.  The defendant argued that “notice was 
required in this case because the ‘other medium’ language used in section 770.01 
includes the internet and internet forums such as the website at issue in this case.”  Id. 
at 1307.  The plaintiffs, on the other hand, argued that the “other medium” of section 
770.01 was intended to include only television and radio broadcasting stations, and thus 
no notice was required in their case.  Id.  
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In deciding whether section 770.01 applied to the defendant, Judge Lenard first 
acknowledged that “[w]hether the internet is included as part of the ‘other medium’ 
language . . . is an issue that has not been definitively resolved by the Supreme Court of 
Florida . . . .”  However, Judge Lenard found to be persuasive two Florida lower court 
decisions, Canonico v. Calloway, 35 Med. L. Rptr. 1549 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 22, 2007), 
and Holt v. Tampa Bay Television, Inc., 34 Med. L. Rptr. 1540, 1542 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 
17, 2005), aff’d by 976 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).  In Canonico, the trial court 
dismissed the plaintiff’s defamation claim relating to statements made on the internet 
because the plaintiff had not complied with section 770.01.  In Holt, the trial court 
rejected the plaintiff’s contention that section 770.01 does not apply to stories published 
on the internet, even by a media defendant.
Judge Lenard pointed out that “all of the cases cited by Plaintiffs in support of 
their argument – with the exception of [Zelinka] – pre-date, by at least a decade, the use 
of the internet by the general public, and do not directly address whether the internet is 
considered in the category of ‘other medium’ as contemplated by section 770.01.”  Id. at 
1308.  Judge Lenard further ruled that Zelinka was inapposite to the case because the 
Alvi defendant was not a “private individual who merely posts a message on [an 
internet] board.”  Id.  Rather, “Plaintiffs have brought suit against a company that 
allegedly owns, hosts and publishes the offending website, which provides information 
to the consumer public, and against the principal owner of that website, who is alleged 
to control the website’s operations.”  Id.    
Most recently, in Five for Entertainment, S.A. v. Rodriguez, 877 F. Supp. 2d 1321 
(S.D. Fla. 2012), a concert promoter sued the defendants, a Reggaeton musician 
[“Daddy Yankee”] and his booking agency, for defamation resulting from a press release 
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that the defendants posted on their respective websites.  Relying on Alvi, the 
defendants argued that the publication of the allegedly defamatory statements on their 
websites fell within the “other medium” language of section 770.01.  Id. at 1326.  In 
response, the plaintiffs argued that section 770.01’s protection did not apply to the 
defendants “simply because technology now enables those individuals to publish 
information on the internet.”  Id. at 1326-27. 
When deciding the issue, Judge Seitz first pointed out that the parties’ arguments 
had “unnecessarily confused the issue.”  Id. at 1327.  Judge Seitz said: 
Whether the phrase “other medium” in § 770.01 includes the 
internet is not the critical issue here, and, in this Court’s 
view, not even open for debate.  That the internet constitutes 
a “other medium” for the purposes of § 770.01 should be 
well-settled. See Alvi Armani, 629 F.Supp. 2d at 1307.  If the 
defendant in this case was the Miami Herald for example, it 
would make no difference that the alleged statements were 
found in the print or the online version of the paper.  The 
medium through which Defendants made the statements 
then, is not dispositive here.  Rather, the issue is whether 
these Defendants are the type of parties contemplated to 
receive pre-suit notice under § 770.01.  
There is no dispute in Florida about who is entitled to receive 
pre-suit notice under § 770.01.  Florida courts have 
recognized that the statute does not apply to private parties 
or nonmedia defendants.  Bridges v. Williamson, 449 So. 2d 
400, 401 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).  The Florida Supreme Court 
has explained that one of the objectives of the statute was to 
afford newspapers and periodicals an opportunity to make a 
full retraction to correct errors and avoid exposure to punitive 
damages.  Ross v. Gore, 48 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1950).
Id. “Accordingly, § 770.01 does not extend to nonmedia defendants.”  Id.  With that 
stated, Judge Seitz went on to rule on whether the defendants in the case were 
“nonmedia” defendants, and thus not entitled to the protection of section 770.01.  
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Ultimately, Judge Seitz found that the defendants were ”nonmedia” defendants.  
Specifically, Judge Seitz made the following findings: 
Turning to the Complaint, the Court finds no meaningful 
allegations that the Defendants were engaged in the 
dissemination of news and information.  The Complaint 
provides that Daddy Yankee posted a press release on his 
personal website as well as Icaro’s, both of which are 
available to the public.  The Complaint provides no other 
allegations concerning any other information disseminated 
from the websites.  For example, there is no indication that 
the websites ever disseminated any other information, 
whether it be traditional news or simply self-promotional or 
“infomerical” materials.  Assuming that the press release 
constituted news, the one-time publication of that press 
release does not render Daddy Yankee or Icaro members of 
the news media.  They are private parties with their own 
websites who released information about the cancellation of 
Daddy Yankee’s tour on one occasion.  Finding that Daddy 
Yankee and Icaro were media parties on these facts would 
abolish any distinction between private parties and members 
of the media. 
Id.  
With this emerging legal landscape in mind, we turn to the case here, where the 
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of VanVoorhis because it determined that 
the words “other medium” of section 770.01 were expansive enough to include the 
internet and a blog, and that VanVoorhis’s blog falls under the rubric of “other medium.”  
In support of this ruling, the trial court cited to the Alvi decision, which applied section 
770.01 to a defendant who made defamatory statements on his website, where his 
website was owned and operated for the purpose of providing consumer information on 
the hair restoration and transplant industry.  Comins argues that the trial court erred by 
only considering whether the internet blog is a “medium” under section 770.01 and not 
whether VanVoorhis is a “media defendant.”  
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Important to the analysis here is the Ross court’s discussion of the legitimate 
government interest in requiring presuit notice as a condition precedent under section 
770.01.  In support of its finding that the condition precedent was a valid exercise of the 
legislature’s power, the court emphasized the need for the free dissemination of news 
and fair comment thereon in order for the public to obtain as much information about a 
particular event as possible before forming an opinion.  Not only did the court 
emphasize the importance of the dissemination of facts, but it also emphasized the 
importance of the dissemination of “fair comment” and “analytical criticism.”  The court 
said that “it is vital that no unreasonable restraints be placed upon the working news 
reporter or the editorial writer.”  Ross, 48 So. 2d at 415 (emphasis added).  
In answering the question whether VanVoorhis’s blog and blog posts come within 
the purview of the prescribed “other medium” entitled to presuit notice, we look to the 
Ross decision to determine whether the blog is operated to further the free 
dissemination of information or disinterested and neutral commentary or editorializing as 
to matters of public interest.  VanVoorhis contends that blogs like “Public Intellectual” 
have “stepped into the void left by a shrinking print industry, and perform the same 
important function – delivering news, information, and commentary to the masses.”  On 
the other hand, Comins characterizes VanVoorhis as merely an individual “writing from 
his apartment under a pseudonym in between studying for his classes, [who] was under 
no pressure whatsoever to deliver any information at all, much less to deliver it quickly.”  
As early as 2005, Judge Posner discussed the changing face of news media 
brought about by the internet: 
The latest, and perhaps gravest, challenge to the journalistic 
establishment is the blog. Journalists accuse bloggers of 
having lowered standards. But their real concern is less 
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high-minded - it is the threat that bloggers, who are mostly 
amateurs, pose to professional journalists and their principal 
employers, the conventional news media. A serious 
newspaper, like The Times, is a large, hierarchical 
commercial enterprise that interposes layers of review, 
revision and correction between the reporter and the 
published report and that to finance its large staff depends 
on advertising revenues and hence on the good will of 
advertisers and (because advertising revenues depend to a 
great extent on circulation) readers. These dependences 
constrain a newspaper in a variety of ways. But in addition, 
with its reputation heavily invested in accuracy, so that every 
serious error is a potential scandal, a newspaper not only 
has to delay publication of many stories to permit adequate 
checking but also has to institute rules for avoiding error - 
like requiring more than a single source for a story or limiting 
its reporters' reliance on anonymous sources - that cost it 
many scoops.
Blogs don't have these worries. Their only cost is the time of 
the blogger, and that cost may actually be negative if the 
blogger can use the publicity that he obtains from blogging to 
generate lecture fees and book royalties. Having no staff, the 
blogger is not expected to be accurate. Having no 
advertisers (though this is changing), he has no reason to 
pull his punches. And not needing a large circulation to cover 
costs, he can target a segment of the reading public much 
narrower than a newspaper or a television news channel 
could aim for. He may even be able to pry that segment 
away from the conventional media. Blogs pick off the 
mainstream media's customers one by one, as it were.
And bloggers thus can specialize in particular topics to an 
extent that few journalists employed by media companies 
can, since the more that journalists specialized, the more of 
them the company would have to hire in order to be able to 
cover all bases. A newspaper will not hire a journalist for his 
knowledge of old typewriters, but plenty of people in the 
blogosphere have that esoteric knowledge, and it was they 
who brought down Dan Rather. Similarly, not being 
commercially constrained, a blogger can stick with and dig 
into a story longer and deeper than the conventional media 
dare to, lest their readers become bored. It was the bloggers' 
dogged persistence in pursuing a story that the conventional 
media had tired of that forced Trent Lott to resign as Senate 
majority leader.
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What really sticks in the craw of conventional journalists is 
that although individual blogs have no warrant of accuracy, 
the blogosphere as a whole has a better error-correction 
machinery than the conventional media do. The rapidity with 
which vast masses of information are pooled and sifted 
leaves the conventional media in the dust. Not only are there 
millions of blogs, and thousands of bloggers who specialize, 
but, what is more, readers post comments that augment the 
blogs, and the information in those comments, as in the 
blogs themselves, zips around blogland at the speed of 
electronic transmission.
This means that corrections in blogs are also disseminated 
virtually instantaneously, whereas when a member of the 
mainstream media catches a mistake, it may take weeks to 
communicate a retraction to the public. This is true not only 
of newspaper retractions - usually printed inconspicuously 
and in any event rarely read, because readers have 
forgotten the article being corrected - but also of network 
television news. It took CBS so long to acknowledge Dan 
Rather's mistake because there are so many people 
involved in the production and supervision of a program like 
''60 Minutes II'' who have to be consulted.
Richard A. Posner, Bad News, N.Y. Times, July 31, 2005 (book review), at 1, 10.8  
Agree or disagree with Judge Posner’s characterization of the travails of 
“conventional media” and the virtues of blogs, it is hard to dispute that the advent of the 
8 See also Mortgage-Specialists, Inc. v. Implode-Explode Heavy Industries, Inc., 
999 A.2d 184 (N.H. 2010), where the Supreme Court of New Hampshire was asked to 
determine whether a company that operates a website that ranks various businesses in 
the mortgage industry and allows visitors who register on the site and create usernames 
to post publicly viewable comments about lenders, was a “news organization” entitled to 
constitutional protection.  In holding that Implode-Explode was a news organization 
entitled to constitutional protection, the court explained: 
Although our cases discussing the newsgathering privilege 
have involved traditional news media, such as newspapers, 
see, e.g., Keene Pub. Corp., 117 N.H. at 960, 380 A.2d 261, 
we reject Mortgage Specialists' contention that the 
newsgathering privilege is inapplicable here because 




internet as a medium and the emergence of the blog as a means of free dissemination 
of news and public comment have been transformative.  By some accounts, there are in 
the range of 300 million blogs worldwide.9  The variety and quality of these are such that 
the word “blog” itself is an evolving term and concept.  The impact of blogs has been so 
great that even terms traditionally well defined and understood in journalism are 
changing as journalists increasingly employ the tools and techniques of bloggers – and 
vice versa.  In employing the word “blog,” we consider a site operated by a single 
individual or a small group that has primarily an informational purpose, most commonly 
in an area of special interest, knowledge or expertise of the blogger, and which usually 
provides for public impact or feedback.  In that sense, it appears clear that many blogs 
and bloggers will fall within the broad reach of “media,” and, if accused of defamatory 
statements, will qualify as a “media defendant” for purposes of Florida’s defamation law 
as discussed above.
There are many outstanding blogs on particular topics, managed by persons of 
exceptional expertise, to whom we look for the most immediate information on recent 
developments and on whom we rely for informed explanations of the meaning of these 
developments.  Other blogs run the gamut of quality of expertise, explanation and even-
handed treatment of their subjects.  We are not prepared to say that all blogs and all 
bloggers would qualify for the protection of section 770.01, Florida Statutes, but we 
conclude that VanVoorhis’s blog, at issue here, is within the ambit of the statute’s 
protection as an alternative medium of news and public comment.
9 See Wikipedia, Blog, http://en.wikipedia/wiki/Blog (as of March 24, 2014, 15:29 
GMT).
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The trial court properly determined that VanVoorhis was entitled to presuit notice 
under section 770.01.  The presuit notice requirement of section 770.01 applies to 
allegedly defamatory statements made in such a public medium the purpose of which is 
the free dissemination of news or analytical comment on matters of public concern, as 
suggested in Ross.  The trial court correctly entered judgment in favor of VanVoorhis. 
AFFIRMED.
LAWSON and COHEN, JJ., concur.
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